This study examines whether there has been a decline in the risk of death by battle during wars, testing the 'long peace' hypothesis. The analysis relies on the Expanded War Dataset (Gleditsch, 2004) covering inter-and inter-state wars between 1816-2007. Using untransformed data on war sizes, the estimates do not provide empirical evidence for a decline in war over time. However, normalising the data for global human population does illustrate a likely decline in war from 1947 onwards. The results indicate that despite strong population growth wars have not become more severe.
Wether war has declined in recent history has been been the subject of much, and intense, debate recently. Research suggests that fewer wars are breaking out while more are terminating (Goldstein, 2011) and that violence in general has been on the decline (Pinker, 2011) . Indeed, since the end of the Second World War there has been an apparent decline in the risk of death by battle (Lacina and Gleditsch, 2005; Lacina et al., 2006) ; a trend that does not seem to be abating (Pettersson and Eck, 2018; Pettersson et al., 2019) . The relatively peaceful period in contemporary history (1945 onwards) has been dubbed the 'long peace' (Gaddis, 1986) . A term coined somewhat optimistically just four decades after the ending of one of the most cataclysmic events in recorded human history.
Some studies challenge the idea of the 'long peace', arguing there is no empirical evidence to support this claim based on the analysis of data on interstate wars (Clauset, 2018) and extremely large wars (Cirillo and Taleb, 2016 ) -with inferences based on the fattailed distribution of wars sizes (Richardson, 1948; Cederman, 2003; González-Val, 2016) . Indeed, the 'long peace' can be criticised for being somewhat Eurocentric. Although violent armed conflict has been reduced greatly across the European continents, during the Cold War other regions in the world suffered greatly under the strain of war. Africa as a result of decolonisation (Arnold, 2017) and most notably Asia which was arguably the Cold War's main battlefield, with major powers pitted against each other, both directly and indirectly (Chamberlin, 2018) . 1 The studies providing empirical evidence refuting the 'long peace' or decline-of-war hypothesis clash with empirical regularities in the data identified by other work which does illustrate a decreasing trend in war as a function of time (Martelloni et al., 2018) . Recent contributions to this debate have focused predominantly on identifying changepoints in the war size distribution; assessing points in time after which the distribution changed indicating a decline in war (measured by the number of fatalities). Using this approach 1950 and 1965 have been identified as potential changepoints for interstate wars (Cunen et al., 2018) , while other studies, using a broader sample of wars, have identified potential changepoints around 1950 (Fagan et al., 2019; Spagat and van Weezel, 2020) , with the 1830s, 1910, and 1994 as other contenders (Fagan et al., 2019) .
The analysis presented in this brief paper is similar in spirit to these changepoint-oriented studies. But whereas existing the work employs complex statistical methods and focuses predominantly on war sizes, this study takes a simpler approach focusing on the risk of death in battle. To test whether there has been a decline war, and when this potential decline started, the analysis relies on the inference of a binomial proportion. The frequency of wars of a particular size, before and after a changepoint, can be measured as a proportion of the total number of wars (before and after the changepoint). And this proportion can be modeled as a set of Bernoulli trials using the binomial model. Bayesian inference is used to estimate the distribution if the parameters which provides the advantage that the interpretation of the results is probabilistic. This in contrast with quantities of interest obtained through classic hypothesis tests with accompanying p-values (e.g. Spagat and van Weezel (2020) ).
Using a comprehensive dataset covering wars between 1816-2007 (Gleditsch, 2004) , the analysis provides some evidence for a decline in war, specifically from 1947 onwards. The estimated probability that the risk of being killed in battle is lower between 1947-2007, compared to , is at least 0.66; a threshold at which we can state that is has been likely a decline occurred (see Mastrandrea et al. (2010) ). However, important to note is that this decline is only apparent when the war sizes are normalised for the total global population, to factor in the average risk of someone being killed in battle. Although the untransformed data exhibits similar patterns the estimated probabilities are in all cases smaller, providing no convincing evidence in favour of the decline hypothesis. There are some important issues concerning the analysis of the results and interpretation. First is the data quality, specifically the measurement of battle-deaths. It is very plausible that the reported number of deaths are measured with substantial error, but most importantly potentially different concepts are used; mixing direct and indirect deaths (Lacina et al., 2006) . As such it is hard to make like-for-like comparisons and the analysis will rely on some heroic assumptions, notably that the estimated war sizes will not be off by more than half an order of magnitude. Second, although there has been a substantial increase in global population, this has not corresponded, or so it seems, to an increase in war severity. Some have pointed to a possible explanation in improvements in military medicine (Fazal, 2014) but this explanation seems to neglect other technological advances linked to mobilization levels and army size (Onorato et al., 2014) which are still strongly linked to fatality numbers (Oka et al., 2017) . Information on wars is taken from the Expanded War Dataset (EWD) compiled by Gleditsch (2004) . This dataset covers both intra-and inter-state wars between 1816-2007 (N = 570) . The analysis includes both war types as there is no theoretical justification to analyse them in separation (Cunningham and Lemke, 2013) or focus exclusively on interstate wars as others have done. Excluding civil wars could potentially lead to erroneous conclusions since this type of war has been increasing over time (Miranda et al., 2016) .
Data
War size w it is measured as the total number of battle-related deaths for the entire duration of war i. To approximate the risk of dying during battle, the war size is normalised using total world population taken at the year of onset t with 1816 ≤ t ≤ 2007. Hence normalised war size w it equals w it popt . To create an annual time-series of world population a number of different data sources are used (Klein Goldewijk et al., 2010; van Zanden et al., 2014; United Nations Population Division, 2017) . Missing values, most common before 1950, are linearly interpolated. Figure 1 displays the data.
Methods
The quantity of interest is the frequency of wars with minimal magnitude m; both before and after potential changepointt. Let θ denote the frequency measured as a proportion relative to the total number of wars for each period. The binomial model can then be used to model wars with size ≥ m as a set of Bernoulli trials X i , (i=1,...,n). Note that an important underlying approach is that wars are independent of each other. In other words that the war-generating process is memoryless; as such no time trend is assumed but rather than a stationary process governs the frequency and distribution of war sizes (Clauset, 2020) . 2
Let Y be the observed number of wars with size ≥ m and n the total number of wars. The probability of war y being of size ≥ m can be denoted by θ. Y follows a binomial distribution: Y ∼ B(n, θ)). The conditional probability of y based on θ is given by:
In this framework inference on θ is based on observed proportion p = y/n which serves as point estimate. The likelihood function can be written as:
where L can be estimated using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) to obtain the most likely value for θ given the data.
Of main interest is whether θ changed over time; particularly between two periods. To this end orthodox tests of statistical significance can be employed but these come with two important caveats. First, they rely on asymptotic properties which can be problematic in small samples. Second, they only offer a binary decision -to reject or accept the null hypothesis -rather than informing about the probability with which a development has occurred. Therefore Bayesian inference is used to circumvent these issues. An additional advantage of using a Bayesian approach is that prior information or existing beliefs about the frequency of wars can be incorporated in the analysis using Bayes' Theorem. Within this framework θ is conditional on observed outcome y 3 with the posterior distribution for θ given by:
p(y) is a scaling factor denoting the marginal density of the data such that the probabilities sum to one. Hence Bayes' Theorem can be rewritten in a simplified form:
In plain English this formulation states that the posterior distribution is proportional to the likelihood times the prior distribution. As already established the likelihood of θ can be described by the Bernoulli distribution which only leaves the prior to be specified.
Since θ is defined on the unit interval (0 < θ < 1) the Beta distribution -Beta(a, b) -would be a natural choice as it is bounded to the same interval. Indeed, the Beta distribution is a conjugate prior for the Bernoulli distribution, which entails that it will produce a Beta-distributed posterior; i.e. defined on the unit interval.
It also provides flexibility in defining its shape parameters (a, b) . Specifying the prior one could opt for using a diffuse prior, assigning equal probability to different proportions. The estimate for θ would be similar to what one would obtain using MLE. Such an approach would ignore available information at hand. Specifically the fact that the distribution of war sizes is fat-tailed. Based on prior beliefs we would expect that the proportion of very large wars is smaller than the proportion of large wars. Hence with the prior distribution p(θ) specified as θ ∼ Beta(a, b) , the shape parameters are defined to capture existing beliefs. In this particular case the number of wars of size ≥ m before the changepoint and the number of wars with smaller magnitudes (b). The total number of wars before the change-point is thus given by a + b.
In practical terms this means that the posterior distribution of θ can be inferred by sampling from the Beta distribution with shape parameters set to y + a and n − y + b as illustrated in the equations below.
The posterior is estimated using 10 4 draws from the Beta distribution. The shape parameters are defined partitioning the data across time and war size. Using the timeseries variation of the data, each year t is considered a potential changepointt, with 1859 ≤t ≤ 1970. Admittedly this interval might seem somewhat arbitrary. The boundaries are theoretically informed however. Research has illustrated an upward shift in military size and mobilization levels -important determinants of war fatalities (Oka et al., 2017 ) -from 1859 onwards, followed by a decline from 1970 (Onorato et al., 2014) . These trends coincide with the advance of railways, facilitating higher mobilisation rates, and improvements in guided-missile technology, which are correlated with reductions in army size (Onorato et al., 2014) .
Splitting the data at yeart information from years t ≤t is used to specify parameters of the prior distributionp(θ) : θ ∼ Beta(a, b) . The values for a, b are determined by a second data partition based on war size m. Where a is the number of wars with size ≥ m and b the number of wars with size < m (see code example 1).
Naturally the reported number of people killed by a particular war comes with a degree of uncertainty; therefore the war sizes are log-transformed to the base 10 (Richardson, 1948) and the data is split using a relatively small number of cut-off points. The data is unlikely to be fully accurate given the issues measuring war-related mortality. (Østerud, 2008; Spagat et al., 2009) .
To gauge whether a general decline in war has occurred a relatively simple measure is used: The difference between the prior and posterior distribution. If no change occurred before and aftert then the prior distribution should be a good description of the war size distribution for the period following the changepoint. As such, the 'new' data would not nudge us towards adjusting the prior and hence the difference between prior and posterior should be negligible, close to zero on average. If there is indeed a decline in war -here measured as the change in proportion so wars of a particular size -the expectation is that the difference between posterior and prior is negative. The proportion of relatively larger wars should be higher for the prior then it is for the posterior.
To translate this into a workable statistic the fraction of negative values relative to the total distribution is calculated. Recall that for the prior and posterior there are 10 4 estimated values. These are subtracted from each other and the quantity of interest is the fraction of negative values. This measure has a probabilistic interpretation as it can be thought of as a probability of decline, where higher values correspond to a decline in wars with size ≥ m (see figure 5 for an example).
Results
Figure 2 panel (a) provides a summary of the results using the original untransformed data. It displays the probability of decline for all possible change-points across different magnitudes. Naturally the estimate is zero for m ≥ 3 as this is the lower bound of the data (wars are only included if they attain at least 10 3 battle-related deaths). In general there is not much empirical evidence favouring a decline-of-war hypothesis. Only at the left-end of the interval the results show that for a subset of years the probability of decline is relatively high for wars with size ∼ m ≥ 6. Indeed wars with a severity above 10 6 are extremely rare. The estimated probabilities rarely exceeds the threshold of 0.66 (Mastrandrea et al., 2010) , indicating that a decline in war is as likely as no decline.
The results presented in panel (a) might obscure important temporal patterns. Therefore the probabilities are averaged at annual level as shown in panel (b) . An underlying assumption of this approach is that a decline is noticeable across the whole range of war magnitudes. Naturally this is not entirely true as the proportion of wars with size ≥ 3 will always be 1. In addition it means that shifts in the war-size distribution are ignored in the analysis. Across a range of potential changepoints the results indicate that a decline in war is unlikely. Only after the end of the Second World War (1939-45) does the probability start to creep upward. But it remains relatively low peaking at a paltry Analysing the untransformed data does not account for changes in the risk of people dying during a war (e.g. Lacina et al. (2006) ). Therefore the population-normalised data is used (Fig 3) . A similar pattern emerges in the estimated probabilities but there is a noticeable shift upward, along the y-axis, indicating higher probabilities of a decline.
Rather surprisingly this is a trend across the different potential change-points. For a broad range of war sizes the estimate probability of decline surpasses the 0.66 threshold. Again averaging the probabilities to get a single statistic for each year shows an increase in the probability of decline following the First World War and around the Second World War . Indeed 1940 is the first in which the average estimated probability exceeds 0.66 and it doesn't drop below this threshold in the years following. Of note is that the estimated probability is also relatively high (≥ 0.5) during the period of European colonisation of Africa through the 1880-90s. The estimates point to 1947 as the most likely changepoint. An additional test is carried out partitioning the data at 1946 and focusing on the generated predictions of the prior distribution and how well they predict the proportion of wars between 1947-2007 (see pseudo-code 2). Similar to the previous test the observed proportions of the prior period are used to generate predictions for the posterior period using the Beta distribution. As point estimate we use the average of 10 4 draws from the prior distribution, but we also factor in the uncertainty associated with the estimate. Figure 4 plots the results for the raw (a) and normalised (b) data. The panels display the observed proportions relative to the predicted proportion, along with a 66% uncertainty interval. Between 1946-2007 there is a seeming increase in wars with magnitudes ranging from 10 3 to about 10 4 .5. There is large uncertainty associated with the estimates for wars in the range of 10 5 /10 6 battle-deaths; most probably the result of a small number of data points. The ratio drops to zero after 10 6 as no wars of this magnitude have occurred since 1946, yet.
Again, based on analysis of the untransformed data we would be inclined to draw the conclusion that there is indeed no noticeable decline in war severity across time. Using the data normalised for population provides conflict evidence however. Taking into account developments in population growth over the past two centuries -which have clearly not been hindered by the positive checks of war -the historical pattern of war (i.e. wars between 1816-1946) tend to lead to over-prediction of war severity for the period hence . Accounting for the uncertainty in the generated predictions the results still show that the observed proportions of war severity are around only half of what would be expected for most magnitudes (panel b.) A noticeable exception to this pattern is the peak around 32 deaths per 10 5 people. Here the observed proportions are in line with what we would expect based on historical data. 
Conclusions
Consistent with earlier studies the analysis of this study suggests that there is little empirical evidence in favour of the 'long peace' hypothesis when focusing exclusively on untransformed battle-deaths data. The estimations do show that the probability of a possible decline in war has increased over time, but at no point does it exceed any threshold which could indicate that a decline is more likely than no change in the war-generating process. This conclusions changes however when considering adjusted data to account for the risk of being killed in battle during a war. Here the results echo earlier studies on changepoint indicating that the post-Second World War period does indeed seem to be relatively less belligerent in terms of adjusted fatality numbers. It also illustrates that despite population growth wars have not become more severe.
(a)
Estimated proportion Density 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
(b)
Posterior -prior -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.04 Figure 5 : Example of applied method. Panel (a) shows the estimated posterior (dashed line) and prior (solid line) distribution for wars with size ≥ 10 6 for the data partitioned at t = 1950. Panel (b) illustrates there is seemingly little difference between the prior and posterior. Indeed, the probability of decline is only 0.25 -indicating that an increase in wars with size ≥ 10 6 is actually more likely.
